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Adolf Hitler dealt with several rhetorically difficult situations in the years leading up to Word War II. One 
was his announcement of the invasion of Poland in September 1939. This should not have been a well-re-
ceived message—public sentiment and general domestic conditions did not create a favorable 
environment for another war—yet it was. The same phenomenon had occurred five years earlier, after 
the Night of Long Knives, in July 1934. This analysis looks at the rhetorical strategies Hitler employed in 
both speeches which contributed to his success, specifically in the context of what Kenneth Burke refers 
to as Hitler’s “unifying device.” I conclude by determining that Hitler’s use of several rhetorical strate-
gies detailed by figures such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Althusser, Koutsantoni, and 
Roberts-Miller were key to his rhetorical success.
Hitler’s armed forces invaded Poland on 
September 1, 1939 as the first step of opera-
tion “Fall Weiss.” What would result in six 
years of hostile occupation began aggres-
sively—the operation was “ambitious” and 
“maximum-effort,” with “more than 60 
divisions—nearly two-thirds of the entire 
German army” assigned to it (Axelrod). 
And while the beginnings of World War II 
may have been an impressive display of 
German strength, the sentiments of the 
global community didn’t necessary reflect 
that. Hitler’s invasion might very well have 
even been condemned by his own parlia-
ment, the Reichstag, as its members were 
representatives of a war-weary German peo-
ple who were still feeling the effects of the 
recent “Great War.” But because of a rhetor-
ical foundation Hitler had established five 
years before, that never happened—instead, 
he was able to carry out his invasion with-
out any real objection from the German 
people. Kenneth Burke describes this as 
Hitler’s rhetorical “magic.”
American war correspondent William 
Shirer wrote on the morning of August 31, 
1939—just one day before the invasion of 
Poland—that “everybody [was] against the 
war.” Germans felt this sentiment so strongly 
that people were actually “talking openly” 
about their opposition to it, that they were 
“kicking about being kept in the dark” (Berlin 
145). Shirer mentions how a German com-
plained to him that, “‘We know nothing. 
Why don’t they tell us what’s up?’” (145). It 
was clear that the German public was strongly 
opposed to the idea of war, and all of this even 
prompted Shirer to ask, “How can a country 
go into a major war with a population so 
against it?” (145). And Hitler—either already 
aware of this sentiment or fearing for good 
reason that the public might feel this way—
withheld very important information from 
the public regarding the possibility of war.
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The German populace was also war-
weary because of the difficult German 
economy. In addition, the “war guilt clause” 
of the Treaty of Versailles had assigned all 
blame and moral responsibility for damage 
done to the Allies during the first world 
war to Germany (“Reparations”). This was 
especially humiliating for the country— 
“Germans across the political spectrum 
were offended by the implication that the 
war was a result of German aggression, and 
that Germany alone was responsible for it” 
(“Reparations”). The first world war had 
also distressed global economies, and 
Germany especially suffered from inflation 
on a massive scale—its hyperinflation was 
“the most spectacular the world had seen” 
(Allen). The implications of this problem 
would extend far beyond just the immediate 
effects on the German economy—so much 
so that in hindsight, many scholars now 
actually “blame the episode of German 
hyperinflation for creating the political con-
ditions that led to Hitler’s rise to power” 
(Allen). Yet at the time, this level of eco-
nomic instability meant that for the vast 
majority of the country, another war was 
the last thing on their minds.
In his 1957 book The Philosophy of Literary 
Form, Kenneth Burke describes Hitler as 
being a “man who swung a great people into 
his wake,” a “medicine-man” who “found a 
panacea … that made such sinister unifying 
possible within his own nation” (165). We 
might, and often do, call him a dema-
gogue—one of history’s most notorious. But 
labeling Hitler as a demagogue doesn’t tell us 
much by itself. In Rhetoric and Demagoguery, 
Patricia Roberts-Miller claims that dema-
goguery is a continuum, “neither an identity 
nor a discrete category” (2). Instead of simply 
resigning ourselves to the fact that Hitler was 
somehow able to pull off these rhetorical 
feats, what is more valuable is examining spe-
cific instances of demagoguery. Roberts- 
Miller argues that “an incident of demagogu-
ery matters to the degree that it is part of a 
larger discourse” (3). And while Burke refers 
to Hitler’s rhetoric as being “Nazi magic,” 
Roberts-Miller states that the process of “try-
ing to identify demagogues is too often 
grounded in the notion that particular fig-
ures are nearly magical, and they control the 
prejudiced, emotional, feminized masses 
with a word wand” (3). 
What then made Hitler’s medicine so 
effective that it unified a shattered country? 
That the country was still reeling from the 
effects of that war, economic and otherwise, 
meant that convincing the German public 
that invading Poland and guaranteeing 
themselves entry into another undoubtedly 
costly war should have been a difficult—if 
not impossible—hurdle to overcome for 
Hitler. And it might have been, had Hitler 
not already succeeded in what was supposed 
to be another impossible rhetorical moment 
five years earlier, on July 13, 1934. But he 
did, using three key rhetorical moves to 
override a skeptical audience’s hesitance. 
And so, he did it again on September 1, 
1939. In an effort to understand how this 
was accomplished, this essay will analyze 
those two speeches in the context of Hitler’s 
unifying, “medicinal” rhetoric.
Laying the Groundwork for Poland
Both Hitler’s July 13, 1934 and September 
1, 1939 addresses to the Reichstag were 
instances in which he especially needed to 
work his medicinal magic. The former was 
Hitler’s public explanation and justification 
for the Night of Long Knives, a political 
purge, and the latter announced his 
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watershed decision to invade Poland and 
begin what would become the deadliest war 
in history. Both were addressed to a tired 
and worn public, and both sought to excuse 
and even build support for actions that 
divided public opinion.
But Hitler was able to circumvent these 
obstacles by employing three main strate-
gies: common knowledge markers, paired 
terms, and ingroup and outgroup identifica-
tion. The first, common knowledge markers, 
is a rhetorical device that stresses points of 
shared interest between the author and the 
reader—or in this case, the speaker and the 
audience. Paired terms contrast certain ideas 
and images to create ideological dichoto-
mies, and in/outgroup identification is a 
common method of unification. To best 
understand how Hitler effectively used 
these strategies, this paper will look at the 
latter speech—September 1, 1939—first, as 
its success appears to have been built upon 
Hitler’s earlier rhetorical victory in 1934.
Common Knowledge Markers
Common knowledge markers, Hitler’s first 
strategy, are described by Koutsantoni in 
Developing Academic Literacies as rhetorical 
devices that “stress common knowledge 
between authors and readers” to “support their 
own claims and therefore strengthen them, by 
stressing the fact that they are based on knowl-
edge that everyone in the field is (or should be) 
familiar with” (146-47). These markers can be 
“expressions of generalized attribution”—such 
as it is known—which work by “[referring] to 
points that are considered … self-explanatory” 
(147). They can also be adjectives such as com-
mon, which work to “convey normality” (146). 
And Hitler, whose ideas were far from normal, 
clearly stood to benefit by inserting such mark-
ers throughout his speech.
In introducing his plan for Poland, Hitler 
begins laying the foundation for his reason-
ing by first telling the Reichstag that “[for] 
months [Germany has] been suffering under 
the torture of a problem which the Versailles 
Diktat created,” a problem that “has deterio-
rated until it [has become] intolerable” 
(“1939”). Hitler adds that “Danzig was and is 
a German city,” that “[the] Corridor was and 
is German,” and that “[both] these territories 
owe their cultural development exclusively to 
the German people.” He says in addition to 
the fact that “[more] than 1,000,000 people 
of German blood had in the year 1919–1920 
to leave their homeland,” “all German 
minorities living [in the Corridor] have been 
ill-treated in the most distressing manner.”
Although Hitler’s first couple of state-
ments might be subjective and could 
possibly be put up for debate, the last one is 
less so. Even though Hitler uses absolutes—
like “all” and “most”—the claim is a little 
harder to argue with on the merit that there 
does exist some empirical evidence support-
ing it. But it is clear in this introduction 
that Hitler attributes Germany’s hardships 
as arising solely from the harsh terms of the 
Treaty of Versailles. By doing so, Hitler 
shifts blame away from something that 
might be found within the state to an exter-
nal factor that is out of his control. Painting 
Germany as being unfairly subjected to this 
abuse creates a feeling of helplessness and 
victimization that he will gather as momen-
tum in continuing his argument.
After airing out these grievances, Hitler 
begins recounting the events that he says 
factored in to his decision to invade Poland. 
He talks about his many attempts at mak-
ing “proposals for revision … of this 
intolerable position” that Germany finds 
itself in, which he reminds the Reichstag, 
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“as you know, have been rejected.” Hitler 
tells them, “You know the proposals that I 
have made. … You know the endless 
attempts I made for a peaceful clarification 
and understanding.” And regarding the 
British government’s proposal that Poland 
and Germany should try again at arriving at 
a compromise, Hitler says to the Reichstag 
that he had “worked out a basis for these 
negotiations which are known to you.” Yet 
he never actually elaborates on what those 
negotiations entailed. Instead, he continues 
as if he assumes that his audience both 
remembers and understands what those 
negotiations were.
This is a strategic assumption. There are 
certain phrases Hitler continually uses 
when addressing the Reichstag—specifi-
cally, you know and known to you—that he 
offers in lieu of evidence proving he actually 
did what he said he did. Hitler seems to be 
justifying his claims with them. But he 
never does his audience the favor of actually 
explaining what he’s referring to when he 
uses these phrases, even though he repeats 
them multiple times throughout the speech.
Hitler then reminds the Reichstag that he 
“tried to solve the problem of Danzig, the 
Corridor,” simply because “[that] the problems 
had to be solved was clear.” He does not qual-
ify that statement to clarify that in his opinion, 
this was clear. It just was. And he does the 
exact same thing when he starts talking about 
Germany’s relationship with Russia.
Hitler says that, “[given] the fact that 
Soviet Russia has no intention of exporting 
its doctrine to Germany, [he] no longer 
[sees] any reason why [they] should still 
oppose one another,” because “[on] both 
sides [they] are clear on that.” So, not only 
does Hitler insist that his audience already 
knows what he’s talking about, he also 
positions issues in ways that portray them as 
being extremely evident or obvious. The 
order of his argument may be reversed so 
that his conclusion is first and his premise is 
second, but he is still assuming and imply-
ing that it is just as clear to Russia as it is to 
Germany what the nature of their relation-
ship and the basis of their agreement is.
The latter part of Hitler’s 1939 speech 
focuses on his many attempts to address 
and improve Germany’s relations with 
Poland. He repeatedly tells the Reichstag, I 
have done this or that. He says, “On my own 
initiative I have, not once but several times, 
made proposals for the revision of intolera-
ble conditions” and that “[in] the same way, 
I have also tried to solve the problem of 
Danzig, the Corridor, etc., by proposing a 
peaceful discussion.” But when his efforts 
were proving to be futile, he tells the 
Reichstag, “I made one more final effort to 
accept a proposal for mediation on the part 
of the British Government.” Hitler tells 
them that when he accepted it, “[for] two 
whole days [he] sat in [his] government and 
waited … for the Polish Government to 
send a plenipotentiary,” but still, “they did 
not send us [one].” By offering these 
attempts he had made as proof that he gen-
uinely tried to resolve the issue peacefully, 
Hitler eliminates a possible objection to war 
on the grounds that there might be other 
non-violent avenues to take.
Essentially, Hitler gives the German people 
his personal account of what happened and 
states as fact that they do remember—or at 
least recognize—what he refers to in his 
speech. But in reality, what he said never hap-
pened. At least not in the way he said it did.
According to Shirer, Hitler agreed to the 
British government’s proposal only on the 
condition that a “Polish emissary, with full 
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powers to conclude negotiations, must 
arrive in Berlin the next day” (20th 436). 
This was impossible, and Hitler was well 
aware of it. He had only given his proposal 
to Henderson, the British ambassador to 
Germany, the night before, so there was 
legitimately no way that the Polish govern-
ment could have received Hitler’s message 
and sent an emissary down in time to meet 
Hitler’s deadline. Shirer says this proves that 
Hitler’s proposals were “never meant to be 
taken seriously,” that they were only “a sham 
to fool the German people and, if possible, 
world opinion into believing that Hitler, at 
the last moment, in an attempt to reach a 
reasonable settlement had made a fair offer 
to Poland and that the Polish government 
would not even send an emissary to Berlin 
to discuss it” (438). So, the proposal Hitler 
said he had accepted from the British 
Government, “that Poland and Germany 
should come into direct contact and once 
more pursue negotiations,” the proposal he 
said he “worked out a basis for … that were 
known to [the Reichstag],” was purely a stra-
tegic and manipulative tactic. And when 
Hitler says in his speech that he waited “two 
whole days” for a Polish plenipotentiary, he 
was simply lying. But Hitler pulled it off 
well—Shirer writes that on 3:30 AM of 
September 1, listening to the German broad-
cast announcing the proposals to Poland, he 
was “taken aback by their reasonableness,” 
and that, “having to translate them for our 
American listeners immediately … [he] 
missed the catch”—that catch being Hitler’s 
attempt to warp time (Berlin 146).
Hitler later even admitted that he was 
lying. Shirer says that Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s 
interpreter, had overheard Hitler say that 
“[he] needed an alibi ... especially with the 
German people, to show them that [he] had 
done everything possible to maintain the 
peace,” which “explains [his] generous offer 
about Danzig and the Corridor” (20th 438). 
It also explains why Hitler says to the 
Reichstag that, “when [he] now [asks] sacri-
fices of the German people and if necessary 
every sacrifice,” that “[he has] a right to do so” 
(“1939”). Hitler was using those proposals as 
proof for the Germans that he had exhausted 
every possibility, when he really had not. And 
by giving his audience that illusion, Hitler is 
able to overcome that hurdle and take the lib-
erty of continuing with his argument.
Given this information, it seems that Hitler 
was using those common knowledge markers 
in the first half of his speech to lay the foun-
dation for this “proof.” By assuming that his 
audience already remembered what he was 
talking about, Hitler was able to create some 
facsimile of a logical chain of reasoning.
When Hitler was addressing his audience 
using those common knowledge markers, 
when he was making those assumptions, 
what he was doing was essentially priming 
them to be his enablers. Jasinski says this 
“process of hailing or being called on” is 
similar to Althusser’s definition of interpel-
lation, which occurs when “the act of 
addressing [a] person does something: it 
positions the person in a certain way” (320). 
Interpellation works because “[when] the 
person recognizes or acknowledges that he 
or she is being called on, the person is 
‘recruited’ … into [that] position” (320). 
Hitler recruited his audience through inter-
pellation by using those prompting phrases, 
by positioning them to support his decision 
to invade Poland despite the fact that audi-
ence members opposed what that decision 
actually meant—war. But by layering his 
lies in between those phrases, by acting 
both like his audience agreed with him and 
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that what he was saying made complete log-
ical sense, Hitler made it nearly impossible 
to refute what he was saying.
Hitler took full advantage of the fact that 
those common knowledge markers were 
supposed to be self-explanatory. He used 
those phrases to make his audience feel that 
they were supposed to be familiar with what 
he was talking about, that they should rec-
ognize and accept it. By doing so, he called 
them to be part of an imaginary “commu-
nity” of people who supported his actions.
The Night of Long Knives
Five years earlier, Hitler had used the exact 
same tactic in his public speech addressing 
the events of June 30, 1934—also known as 
the Night of Long Knives. His purpose this 
time was similar; Hitler had to convince his 
audience of the existence of a problem he 
characterized as being an imminent reality 
and needing to be urgently solved.
The Night of Long Knives was just as 
deadly as it sounds. It was a purge of Hitler’s 
political dissidents that ended in the deaths 
of—as he lists out—nineteen high-ranking 
SA leaders, thirty-one other SA leaders and 
members, three SS leaders, five non-SA 
party comrades, and “three members of the 
SS … guilty of disgraceful abuse of prison-
ers in protective custody” who were shot; 
thirteen SA leaders and civilians who had 
“resisted arrest and sacrificed their lives in 
the process”; and finally, “three other lives” 
that were “ended by suicide” (“1934,” 498). 
The SA, the Sturmabteilung, was the Nazi 
party’s paramilitary organization; the SS, 
the Schutzstaffel, was Heinrich Himmler’s 
paramilitary force. 
Historian Richard Evans reports that many 
people already “suspected that there was more 
to the events of 30 June than met the eye,” 
that this suspicion was so prevalent that “local 
police authorities [even] reported an atmo-
sphere of widespread rumor and speculation, 
‘grumbling’ and ‘carping’” (38). It should 
have been extremely difficult for Hitler to 
explain away this deadly event to such a wary 
public. But surprisingly, Evans concludes, 
this “open confession of the complete illegal-
ity of his action in formal terms,” this candid 
listing of lives lost on that night, “did not run 
into any criticism from the judicial authori-
ties” (38). In fact, Hitler’s speech was so 
effective that the Reichstag “enthusiastically 
applauded Hitler’s justification and passed a 
resolution thanking him for his action”; a law 
was even passed soon after, which gave 
Hitler’s actions “retroactive legality” (38).
Evans gives an account of a schoolteacher 
named Luise Solmitz who had initially 
described that day’s events as one that had 
“shattered all of us right down to our inner-
most heart” (39). But “[as] details began to 
emerge” during Hitler’s public address, 
Solmitz began to “[find] herself overcome 
with admiration for Hitler’s conduct” (39). 
She quickly reversed her position, saying 
that, “The personal courage, the decisive-
ness and effectiveness [Hitler] showed in 
Munich, the decisiveness and effectiveness, 
that is unique” (39). Moreover, Evans says 
that her reaction was “not untypical” of the 
public (38). Hitler’s speech had apparently 
worked its magic.
The way in which Hitler introduced the 
problem in 1934 was a prequel to the way he 
would start his Poland speech five years later. 
He says that there had been “prattle of a new 
revolution, of a new upheaval, of a new upris-
ing,” that eventually became “no longer 
possible to simply dismiss as empty chatter” 
(488). Hitler says that his “[repeated] attempts 
to remedy this [problem] through normal 
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official channels failed each time” (489). Just 
like how he would frame the problem of 
Poland to be one that he was finally forced to 
address, Hitler establishes that he had “repeat-
edly” tried being peaceful in the events leading 
up to the Night of Long Knives, but reluctance 
and lack of cooperation by others meant he 
eventually had to resort to using violence.
Hitler then says that he has “always 
stressed that an authoritarian regime bears 
particularly great responsibilities,” that he 
has “always insisted that higher demands be 
placed upon the behavior and conduct of 
National Socialist leaders than upon the 
other Volksgenossen” (490). By using the 
phrase I have always, Hitler tries not just to 
lend credibility to what he is saying, but 
frames it in a way that there is no excuse for 
his audience to have thought otherwise. 
Unless his audience knows every single one 
of his actions, which they did not, this was a 
non-rebuttable phrase. In this situation, they 
had no choice but to take him at his word.
Hitler tells his audience that he hopes the 
purge will “hopefully [live] on in … history 
for all time as both a sad reminder and a 
warning,” saying that it had grown out of “a 
combination of objective circumstances and 
personal guilt, of human incompetence and 
human defects” (485). He does his victims 
no favors in painting them as a slothful 
enemy, saying their “inborn incompetence” 
meant that they were “unable … to prove 
their worth by positive, useful work” (486). 
But the enemy were also “deserters and 
mutineers,” and Hitler tells the Reichstag 
that they must “inwardly disassociate [them-
selves] from these concepts” (486). These 
concepts, he says, are “oppositional ele-
ments” to the German Volk (487).
In describing what compelled him to act 
as harshly as he did, Hitler says:
Honor and obedience forced us to 
refuse to obey [to the usurpers]; love 
of the nation and Vaterland obliged us 
to wage war on them; the amorality of 
their laws extinguished in us the con-
viction of the necessity for complying 
with them—and hence we became 
revolutionaries. However, even as rev-
olutionaries, we had not disassociated 
ourselves from the obligation to apply 
to ourselves the natural laws of the 
sovereign right of our Volk and to 
respect these laws. (486)
Hitler emphasizes the fact that he took 
action out of necessity, saying that:
It was not our intention to violate the 
will and the right of self-determina-
tion of the German Volk, but to drive 
away those who violated the nation …
When a deathly check is violently 
imposed upon the natural develop-
ment of a Volk, an act of violence may 
serve to release the artificially inter-
rupted flow of evolution to allow it 
once again the freedom of natural 
development. (486)
Hitler says these dissidents are nothing 
more than a “little colony of drones,” claim-
ing that they are “without any living contact 
with life, with the feelings, hopes and cares 
of the rest of the Volk” (488). And they are 
especially dangerous, since they are “verita-
ble germ-carriers for unrest, uncertainty, 
rumors, allegations, lies, suspicions, slander, 
and fear,” “[breaking] every single law of 
decency and modesty” and poisoning what 
should be a “healthy Volk,” making it so 
that it has become “difficult to recognize or 
draw the natural boundaries between them 
and the Volk” (488).
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So, Hitler says, there could be “no ques-
tion of the fact that it would be better to 
destroy a hundred mutineers, plotters and 
conspirators than to allow ten thousand 
innocent SA men on the one hand and ten 
thousand equally innocent persons on the 
other to bleed to death” (498). With this, he 
warns that “[the] nation should know that 
no one can threaten its existence—which is 
guaranteed by inner law and order—and 
escape unpunished!” (497).
Paired Terms
Throughout this entire disparaging narra-
tive, Hitler also speaks in paired terms, 
pitting the opposition’s vision of what he 
calls a “Communist paradise” against his 
goals for the National Socialist State (485). 
Paired terms are a rhetorical concept essen-
tial to the idea of dissociation that is 
outlined by Chaim Perelman and Lucie 
Olbrechts-Tyteca in The New Rhetoric. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca refer to 
them as “philosophical pairs,” describing 
them as “notions that are formed on the 
model of the ‘appearance-reality’ pair” typi-
cally found in philosophy (24). Here, each 
pair is actually an opposition that symbol-
izes a dissociation of certain ideas—“in each 
case, reality is opposed to appearance” (24). 
A philosophical pair works toward dissocia-
tion by “[depreciating] … an accepted 
value” and replacing it with another that is 
then “accorded the original value” (24). The 
only requirements are that an opposing con-
ception must be “shown to be valuable, 
relevant, as well as incompatible with the 
common use of the same notion” (24). 
Essentially, the paired terms work to create a 
comprehensive picture of two dichotomous 
images that each derive part of their image 
from their opposition of the other. 
Hitler’s choice of terms focuses on con-
trasting the evils he says Germany is 
currently dealing with—namely, the “amoral,” 
“germ-carrying” conspirators—with what 
he says the country should be striving 
toward and working to protect—the true 
German Volk. When Hitler emphasizes the 
importance of dissociating from the enemy, 
he makes sure to draw a distinction between 
the revolutionaries that the enemy is and the 
revolutionaries he says the National Socialist 
State is composed of. He says that the for-
mer are revolutionaries who have “lost all 
inner connection to a regulated human 
social order,” while his revolutionaries are 
tied to “the obligation to apply to ourselves 
the natural laws of the sovereign right of our 
Volk” (486). The terms Hitler uses to por-
tray the enemy are placed above the terms he 
uses to describe his own forces. Each con-
trast these terms draw builds upon each 
other to bolster his message.
Table 1
Paired terms in Hitler’s 1934 Speech to 
the Reichstag
“Lower” Term “Higher” Term
Deserters, mutineers, 
plotters, conspirators
Revolutionaries, 
innocent persons
“Germ-carriers” Healthy Volk
Amoral laws Natural laws
Unrest, uncertainty, 
rumors, allegations, lies, 
suspicion, slander, fear
Inner law and order
Hitler would later use the same tactic in 
his 1939 speech to highlight the contrasts 
between his characterizations of Poland and 
Germany—specifically, that Poland was 
“strangling … the Free City of Danzig,” that 
they were placing “undue pressure” and 
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inflicting “terror” on German citizens. 
Hitler himself, however, had a “love of peace 
and … patience” and was striving toward a 
“peaceful co-existence.” To Hitler, Germany 
represents freedom, while Poland is the 
oppressive perpetrator of “serious atrocities” 
against peaceful German people.
Table 2
Paired terms in Hitler’s 1939 Speech to 
the Reichstag
Freedom Oppression, 
persecution
Peace, patience “Serious atrocities”
By using these paired terms, Hitler is able 
to subtly illustrate two different group 
memberships. Roberts-Miller says this tech-
nique is inherent to demagoguery, because 
“the accusation of bias is made through 
assertions about group membership, and 
such assertions release the rhetor from the 
responsibility of actually engaging the argu-
ment” (17). And so, Hitler’s reasons for 
invading Poland appear to be truly justified 
even without him having to prove a legiti-
mate argument.
Ingroup / Outgroup Association
Hitler then builds upon this villainous 
characterization of the enemy by delving 
into specifics, naming the four main groups 
he has identified as being particularly 
“destructive elements” (“1934” 486). The 
first he calls a “phenomenon which poisons 
and makes dupes of the Volk,” while “the 
second group of discontented is comprised 
of those political leaders who regard their 
futures as having been settled by January 30 
but who have never been able to reconcile 
themselves to the irreversibility of this fact” 
(485). The third group is “made up of those 
revolutionaries who were shaken and 
uprooted in 1918 in regard to their relation 
to the State and who thus,” according to 
Hitler, “have lost all inner connection to a 
regulated human social order”; they are 
“pathological enemies” of the State (486). 
Finally, the fourth are those who “have 
nothing to do and thus find the time and 
opportunity to deliver oral reports on every-
thing capable of bringing some interesting 
and important variety to their lives which 
are,” in Hitler’s eyes, “otherwise completely 
meaningless” (487). Hitler harshly criticizes 
the fourth group of people as being those 
whose “sole activity consists of doing noth-
ing, followed by more of the same to 
recuperate from having done nothing”—
meanwhile, “the overwhelming majority in 
the nation is made to earn its daily bread by 
toilsome labor, in certain classes of life” 
(487). By saying this, by characterizing 
these groups as being the complete opposite 
of what he says real “Volk” are, Hitler 
focuses his audience’s attention on that 
stark contrast. By polarizing these two main 
groups—the Volk and the “usurpers”—
Hitler encourages his audience to foster 
resentment and direct enmity and hostility 
towards those he claims are lazy and have 
nothing better to do with their time but 
incite violence and revolution.
Outlining these outgroups gave Hitler’s 
audience the tools to achieve identification 
through antithesis, a method of unification 
within an ingroup that occurs when the group 
“focuses on uniting in the face of a shared 
enemy” (Jasinski 305). Identification is a 
concept described by Kenneth Burke that 
deals intimately with the role of language— 
language, and rhetoric more specifically, must 
be used to “promote identification or over-
come division” within people who are 
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inherently divided (Jasinski 305). Yet identifi-
cation is not incompatible with the 
preservation of personal identity: Burke says 
that two people, A and B, are not identical; 
however, “insofar as their interests are joined, 
A is identified with B” (qtd. in Jasinski 305).
In Hitler’s demagoguery, the ultimate 
ingroup is the Volk, the German people. In 
his 1939 speech, Hitler not only reinforced 
this idea by portraying Poland, the enemy, as 
being the ultimate “other,” but by targeting 
German “traitors” as well. He says, “We have 
nothing to do with traitors,” that “It is quite 
unimportant whether we ourselves live, but it 
is essential that our people shall live, that 
Germany shall live.” Poland and any traitors 
stand in opposition to Hitler’s community 
that he says is “bound together by vows, ready 
for anything, resolved never to surrender.” 
The overwhelming sentiment created by 
this in- and out-grouping is that of the need 
for self-preservation and self-defense. Hitler 
was fully aware of the power of this strategy, 
saying that, “As a whole, and at all times, the 
efficiency of the truly national leader consists 
primarily in preventing the division of the 
attention of a people, and always in concen-
trating it on a single enemy … It is part of the 
genius of a great leader to make adversaries of 
different fields appear as always belonging to 
one category only” (qtd. in Burke 165).
Conclusion
Rhetoric attempts to explain the ways in 
which words move people to action. How 
these words are used, how they are arranged, 
and the context in which they live—these all 
affect the final impact of those words. While 
it may not give us the ability to determine 
for certain an individual’s motive, rhetoric 
gives us the power to identify the connec-
tions between certain words and phrases, to 
analyze their interactions and effects. 
Sometimes, the effects are big. And Hitler’s 
1939 speech announcing the invasion of 
Poland wasn’t even just monumental; it 
changed the trajectory of world history. 
With the use of strategies as simple as com-
mon knowledge markers, paired terms, and 
ingroup/outgroup identification, Hitler was 
able to justify the unjustifiable.
Hitler had told his audience at the begin-
ning of his 1934 speech that he would be 
“completely frank” with them regarding the 
events that occurred on the night of June 30 
(485). To his credit, Hitler did present an 
extensive list of the people who had been 
killed during the purge. And given this 
extremely clear and straightforward depic-
tion of the enemy, it truly might have 
appeared to his audience that Hitler really 
was just getting to the point. Using com-
mon knowledge markers that subtly 
positioned his audience to readily support 
him only added to this illusion. The things 
Hitler publicly admitted to doing were so 
inhumane that they should have been inex-
cusable. But by using paired terms, he was 
able to portray the enemy to be so terribly 
evil that his actions would be seen as a 
response of the appropriate magnitude. In 
addition, Hitler had offered forth four clear 
outgroups. He gave his audience an enemy 
to focus on and band together against, 
essentially providing them with everything 
they needed to participate in identification 
through antithesis.
All of these factors—common knowledge 
markers, reinforced by paired terms, combined 
with clear ingroup and outgroup identifica-
tion—made for a deadly but extremely 
effective cocktail of drugs. Administered 
against the backdrop of the chaos lingering 
from the First World War, it gave Hitler his 
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seemingly magical ability to unite the country 
and rise to power. Kenneth Burke described 
Hitler’s Mein Kampf as “the well of Nazi 
magic,” as a “testament of a man who swung a 
great people into his wake” (164-65). Seventy-
eight years ago, in 1957, Burke said that “[a] 
people trained in pragmatism should want to 
inspect this magic,” to “[let] us watch it 
carefully,” so that we might know “exactly 
what to guard against, if we are to forestall the 
concocting of similar medicine in America” 
(164-65). In 2019, it’s not difficult to find simi-
lar rhetorical strategies at play in the realm of 
US political leadership—so let us hope we 
continue to do so.
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